This Note first argues that the Supreme Court, by failing to apply the well established rational basis standard of review to its constitutional analysis of the Gun Free School Zones Act, wrongly decided the fate of the Act. Under the rational basis test, the relevant judicial inquiry is whether Congress could have rationally concluded that gun possession at school affects interstate commerce. Because Congress, in related gun control legislation, specified the link between juvenile gun possession and interstate commerce, Congress could have rationally concluded that guns at school affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, even if Congress was required to provide express findings linking gun violence in the schools with interstate commerce, it did so, albeit retroactively.
In finding constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause for the Gun Free School Zones Act, this Note examines judicial scrutiny of other gun control legislation, as well as broader social policy initiatives. In so doing, this Note reconciles Congress' ability to regulate through its commerce power over areas traditionally left to the state or local government, such as crime and education, with states' rights under the Tenth Amendment.
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Finally, this Note argues that the Supreme Court erred in determining that gun violence at school does not substantially affect interstate commerce. The existence of guns in schools creates an intimidating learning environment which deteriorates the quality of American education. A substandard educational process creates a workforce which produces poorer quality goods and services. Given that these outputs are traded in interstate commerce, guns at school substantially affect interstate commerce. This Note thus concludes that the Gun Free School Zones Act was a permissible exercise of Congress' commerce power. II . BACKGROUND The Supreme Court, in determining that the Gun Free School Zones Act was an impermissible exercise of Congress' legislative authority, cited the lack of express congressional findings linking the Act to interstate commerce,' 5 emphasized the intrastate nature of education, 16 and expressed a desire to reserve educational issues to the domain of local government'1 7 This section first reviews relevant constitutional jurisprudence including the evolution of Congress' expanding power under the modem Commerce Clause and the interrelated inquiry of local government sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. Second, this section provides a brief synopsis of the legislative and judicial development of the Gun Free Schools Zone Act and compares the Act to other related federal gun control initiatives that have mustered judicial scrutiny.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE & THE TENTH AMENDMENT
Under the Commerce Clause, the Constitution delegates to Congress the power " [ t] o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."' 8 If Congress exercises legislative power beyond that delegated to it under the Commerce Clause, it may also violate the Tenth Amendment, 19 for both issues are interrelated. 20 If a power is delegated to Congress, through the Commerce Clause for example, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation 3 2 b. Using the Commerce Clause to Achieve Police Power Although the Constitution did not grant Congress a national police power, 3 3 Congress attempted to achieve police power objectives though the exercise of its commerce power. 3 4 The Supreme Court initially approved a restrictive use of Congress' commerce power to police goods moving in interstate commerce. 3 5 In establishing the boundaries of this "police power" the Court established a "direct" versus "indirect" test 3 6 The Court held that activities that affected interstate commerce directly were within Congress' powers, while activities that affected interstate commerce only indirectly were beyond Congress' reach. 3 7 Accordingly, Congress could prohibit the interstate transport of "contraband" such as lottery tickets, 3 8 impure foods, 3 9 and stolen vehicles. 40 Congress, however, could not regulate "production," 4 1 "manufacture," 4 2 and "mining" 43 activities because these were 31 Id. 32 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) ("At the beginning ChiefJustice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded."); see al-0 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RiaHTs: BACK TO THE CONSTITUTION (1936) .
3 Classically, these police powers concerned h~alth, morals, and well-being. See, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) . 34 . A federal law restricting the interstate shipping of goods produced by child labor was held unconstitutional as invasive of the reserved powers of the states. Justice Day's opinion distinguished Hammer from other cases, such as the Lottery Case, on the determination that the evil of child labor was confined to the original locality and ended when the goods entered interstate commerce. Id. at 270-72.
42 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (The Sugar Trust Case). The Court affirmed the dismissal of a government civil action under the Sherman Act to nullify the acquisition of competing sugar refineries, which created a monopoly. The Court distinguished between "manufacture" and "commerce." Id. at 11-18. "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not part of it." I. at 12. 43 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("Mining brings the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it.") 19961 1497 seen as local activities which only indirectly affected interstate commerce. Simultaneously, however, the Court held that, where the interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were so intermingled that full regulation of commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, the Commerce Clause authorized such regulation. 44 c. The New Deal Cases
In the 1930s, Congress extended its use of the Commerce Clause beyond federal police power objectives when it used the Commerce Clause to pass President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal agenda. After initial resistance by the Court, an unsuccessful attempt by President Roosevelt to pack the Court, and the subsequent retirement of seven of the nine Supreme Court justices, the President was able to achieve judicial approval of his progressive New Deal legislation. 45 Through judicial appointments, 46 President Roosevelt was able to strengthen the power of the federal government and return the breadth of the commerce power to that initially granted in Gibbons v. Ogden. 47 52 The Court abandoned the "direct' and "indirect" effects test, and concluded that the correct inquiry was whether an intrastate activity has "such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions." 45 For a historical discussion of the Supreme Court's initial resistance to the New Deal legislation, President Franklin D Roosevelt's subsequent unsuccessful attempt to "pack the court," and the subsequent death or retirement of seven of the nine justices, see DAVID P. 55 Instead, the Court determined that Congress' power extended to those activities intrastate which "so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate... Subsequently, in Wickard v. Filburn, 5 7 the Court held that farm production of wheat which is intended for home consumption is subject to Congress' commerce power, because it may have a substantial cumulative effect on interstate commerce. 58 The Court indicated that while the farmer's "contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself," the effect must be considered in light of the farmer's "contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated .... ."59 When the cumulative effect was considered, the Wickard Court found that "[h]ome-grown wheat ... competes with wheat in commerce" 60 because it decreases overall demand for wheat on the market. 6 ' In modem day cases, such as the civil rights cases discussed below, the "affects commerce" principle of Wickard was used as a means for permitting congressional control over intrastate activities not directly connected to interstate commerce. . IV 1992) ). The Act provides for injunctive relief against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation.
CURRIE, THE
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, 66 the Supreme Court determined that Congress could regulate a single hotel located in Georgia because racial discrimination in public lodging burdens travelers, and thus has a deleterious effect on the interstate movement of persons and goods. 67 The Court held that "the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate . . . local activities .... *, 68 In Katzenbach v. McClung, 69 the Court found that although an activity is local and may not be regarded as commerce, Congress may still reach it if the activity has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. 70 The Court determined that such congressional regulation should be judicially scrutinized under a "rational basis" test. 71 Thus, in upholding a Title II action against a local restaurant which refused to provide dining room service to African-Americans, the Court found that Congress had a rational basis for finding that such discrimination had a direct and adverse effect on interstate commerce because the discriminatory restaurants sold less interstate food and obstructed travel.
72
The Civil Rights Cases are important for two reasons. First, they exemplify the Court's broad application of the "cumulative effects" test established in Wickard 73 to achieve social goals. The Court sanctioned Congress' ability to legislate over a single local hotel 74 or local restaurant 75 in order to discourage discrimination. Second, they established that substantial deference is to be granted to congressional intent under the "rational basis" test. To the extent that Congress could rationally believe that the regulated activity affected interstate commerce, Congress could regulate the activity under its commerce power. It is notable that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed the rational basis test even though, like the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, it carried no congressional findings. In Hodel, Justice Marshall held that federal courts must defer to congressional findings that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 8 9 Justice Marshall instructed courts to apply the rational basis standard of review to determine the constitutionality of the law. This deferential standard of review prohibits the courts from substituting their own analysis regarding an act's substantial effect on interstate commerce when the legislature's purpose is legitimate and the law is rationally related to that purpose. 90 
Tenth Amendment Precedent
The Supreme Court has held that commerce power and Tenth Amendment inquiries are "mirror images" of each other. 91 The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t] he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. ' 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW ders. 108 The Court reasoned that when Congress requires states receiving federal funds to undertake particular legislative or regulatory actions, state autonomy is nevertheless preserved because a state may elect to forego the funds. By contrast, the "take title" provision crossed the line between encouragement and coercion because it compelled states to choose between two forms of coerced regulation-accepting ownership of the waste or regulating as Congress dictated.
10 9 Since the Act essentially forced states to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, the Act subjected the States to federal government control and consequently violated fundamental sovereignty principles. 110 As New York did not expressly overrule Garcia, the continued application of Garcia is uncertain. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's current stance on the Tenth Amendment is far from clear.
B.
GUN CONTROL & THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The constitutional right to bear arms stems from the Second Amendment, which states that "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." dition to the Gun Free School Zones Act, to combat increasing crime rates: The Firearm Owners' Protection Act,' 17 The Undetectable Firearms Act," 8 and the Brady Act. 119
Early Second Amendment Constraints
In an effort to curb the extensive violence accompanying the expansion of organized crime during the Prohibition Era, Congress placed limitations on the Second Amendment right to bear arms by passing the National Firearms Act of 1934.120 This Act imposed a $200 tax on transfers of certain automatic weapons, such as sawed off shotguns, and imposed a $5 tax on transfers of other weapons. 
The 1968 Control Acts
After three decades of silence, Congress revived its initiatives to strengthen gun control laws in response to the widespread civil disorder that culminated in the murders of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. when it passed the Omnibus Crime Control Safe 
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operated in interstate commerce. 126 Finally, Congress criminalized the mere possession of firearms by certain individuals, including felons, mental incompetents, drug addicts, and illegal aliens.' 27 Congress justified these provisions by providing express findings linking its gun control initiatives to interstate commerce. 128 Two aspects of the 1968 legislation are relevant in analyzing the Gun Free School Zones Act. First, the 1968 Acts illegalized the mere possession of guns, rather than the transfer of guns in interstate commerce. Second, among the statutory provisions contained in the 1968 legislation was 18 U.S.C. § 922, which was amended in the Gun Free School Zones Act to include the safe school subsection at issue in Lopez.
The Firearm Owners' Protection Act ( § 922(o))
In response to rising crime conducted with automatic assault weapons, Congress passed the Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986.129 This Act makes it unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun. (1) that there is a widespread traffic in firearms moving in or otherwise affecting interstate or foreign commerce, and that the existing Federal controls over such traffic do not adequately enable the States to control this traffic within their own borders through the exercise of their police power; (2) that the ease with which any person can acquire firearms other than a rifle or shotgun (including criminals,juveniles without the knowledge or consent of their parents or guardians, narcotics addicts, mental defectives, armed groups who would supplant the functions of duly constituted public authorities, and others who possession of such weapons is similarly contrary to the public interest) is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States;. 
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1507 SUPREME COURT REVIEW import, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive" any firearm undetectable either by walk-through metal detectors or x-ray machines.14 3
Analogous to the Gun Free School Zones Act, § 922(p) did not by its terms require any link with interstate commerce, but rather banned the mere possession of undetectable guns, no matter how they were produced and obtained. 44 Moreover, like the Gun Free School Zones Act, § 922(p) did not rest on any new congressional findings establishing a link to commerce regulation.
The Brady Act
In response to John Hinckley's attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the resulting injuries sustained by White House Press Secretary James Brady, 14 5 Congress enacted the Brady Act. 146 The purpose of the Brady Act is to prevent convicted felons and other legally barred persons from purchasing guns from licensed gun dealers, manufacturers, or importers.' 4 7 To achieve this objective, the Act imposes a five day waiting period on the purchase of certain handguns. 4 Although public debate has focused on the Brady Act's waiting period requirement and its infringement on the Second Amendment, the background check provision and its impact on the Tenth Amendment have been the focus of judicial inquiry. 49 Unlike other gun control legislation,1 5 0 judicial inquiry regarding the Brady Act has focused on state sovereignty, specifically, whether Congress has the authority to require local law enforcement officials to perform Comp 148 "Handgun" includes a firearm which has a short stock and is designed to be held and fired by the use of a single hand. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(29) (Supp. V 1993). The waiting period allows local law enforcement officers to determine the legality of the attempted gun purchase. Id. In 1998, the waiting period provisions are scheduled to be superseded by a national instant background check computer system established by the Attorney General. When operational, this system will allow dealers to contact a federal computer system and make an instant on-line background check. 152 In Printz, a local sheriff brought an action to seek injunctive relief against enforcement of the Brady Act's provision requiring him to perform a background check on individuals seeking to purchase a firearm. 155 The sheriff argued that he did not have sufficient resources to perform the background checks.' 5 4 The District Court of Montana found that the Brady Act transgressed the "division of authority between the federal and state governments.' u5 5 The Printz court stated that although Congress could enlist the judicial branch to enforce its policies, it could not directly compel states to legislate to "enforce a federal regulatory program." 1 5 6 Federal district courts in Arizona,' 5 7 Mississippi,' 58 and Vermont' 59 have also ruled that the Brady Act exceeds Congressional authority.
The Gun Free School Zones Act

a. The History of The Gun Free School Zones Act
Congress enacted the Gun Free School Zones Act in response to the growing crisis of guns in schools and the related problems of drugs and gang activity. 160 The Act's specific purpose was to "address the devastating tide of firearm violence in our Nation's schools"' 6 '
and to provide "an important step toward fighting gun violence and keeping our teachers and children safe.' 
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Control Act of 1990, the Act's provisions were subsequently adopted by the conference committee' 6 4 and enacted into law as § 1702 of the Crime Control Act of 1990.165
The source of constitutional authority was not manifest on the face of the Act. At the time of the statute's enactment, neither the Act nor its corresponding legislative history contained express congressional findings regarding the effects of gun possession in a school zone upon interstate commerce. 166 In fact, when President George Bush signed the Crime Control Act of 1990 into law, he noted that particular provisions of the legislation constrained the discretion of state and local governments. 167 The President found that the Gun Free Zones Act "inappropriately over r[o]de legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law." 166 The President argued that the policies reflected in the Gun Free Zones Act could be adopted by the states, but that they should not be imposed on the states by Congress.
169
After the Fifth Circuit held that the Gun Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional in 1993 in United States v. Lopez, 170 Congress passed a law which included specific findings as to the nexus between guns at school and interstate commerce. Congress found that "firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been found in increasing numbers in and around schools" and that the resulting "occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline in the quality of education in our country" which has had an "adverse impact on interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States." Id Furthermore, the Senate stated that "Congress has power under the Commerce Clause and other provisions of the Constitution to enact measures to ensure the integrity and safety of the Nation's Schools. Acting on an anonymous tip, school officials confronted Lopez, who admitted that he was carrying the weapon. 185 After being advised of his rights, Lopez explained that an individual he identified as "Gilbert" had given him the gun to deliver to another individual named 'Jason" for use in a "gang war."' 8 6
State authorities immediately charged Lopez with violating § 46.03 (a) (1) of the Texas Penal Code.
8 7 For over twenty years, this statute made it a felony for a person to go "on the premises of a school or an educational institution" while carrying a firearm and stipulated a punishment of up to ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 188 At the time of the Lopez incident, over forty states had similar laws. 18 9 The state charges were dismissed after a federal grand jury indicted Lopez for violating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990,190 which makes it illegal to possess a firearm in a school zone.' 9 ' Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(q) "was unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools."' 92 The District Court denied the motion, concluding that § 922(q) "is a constitutional exercise of Congress' well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of elementary, middle, and high schools... affects interstate commerce.' u9 3 Lopez subsequently waived his right to ajury trial and was tried on the stipulated evidence. 19 4 The District Court convicted Lopez and sentenced him to six months imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release.' 9 5
On appeal, Lopez challenged his conviction based on his claim that § 922(q) exceeded Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. 19 The United States government filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted the government's petition' 98 to determine whether § 922(q) was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 19 9 IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, 20 0 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Gun Free School Zones Act "neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce," and as such the Act exceeded the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. 2 0 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist then provided a lengthy review of the historical development of the Commerce Clause. Touching first on the backdrop of federalism, ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote that the Constitution "creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers" that are "few and defined," and preserves numerous powers for the States. 20 3 ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that such division of authority "was adopted . . . to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties. ' Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized the Court's decisions for nearly a century following Gibbons v. Ogden as dealing "rarely with the extent of Congress' power, and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that discriminated against interstate commerce." 20 9 "Under this line of precedent," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "certain categories of activity such as 'production,' 'manufacturing,' and 'mining' were within the province of state governments and thus were beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause." 2 10
When Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act 2 11 in 1887, and the Sherman Antitrust Act 2 12 in 1890, it "ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce power." 213 In dealing with these statutes, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Court followed the negative Commerce Clause approach in determining that Congress could not regulate activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and "mining." 21 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted, however, that where the interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were mingled together, the Court upheld congressional regulation. 2 15 Chief Justice Rehnquist further noted that during the dawn of the New Deal Era, the Court limited congressional oversight by distinguishing between the "direct" and "indirect" effects of intrastate transactions on interstate commerce. 2 16 Activities that affected interstate commerce directly were within Congress' commerce power, while activities that affected interstate commerce indirectly were beyond Congress' reach. 2 17 The Court drew this distinction for fear that otherwise "there would be virtually no limit to the federal power.... 218 The Court departed from the distinction between "direct" and 226 Under this final category, Chief justice Rehnquist clarified that the activity must "substantially affect," rather than merely "affect" interstate commerce.
27
Having laid the framework for his analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist turned to the current controversy and considered the ability of Congress to enact the Gun Free School Zones Act. 228 Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly disposed of the first two categories of authority by indicating that the Act is neither a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through commerce channels.
29
Moreover, the Gun Free School Zones Act is not a regulation seeking to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in in- In determining whether the Gun Free School Zones Act would fall within the third category, Chief Justice Rehnquist first identified other congressional acts where the Court had held that an activity substantially affected interstate commerce. 23 2 As examples, he cited cases challenging acts that involved the regulation of intrastate coal mining, 233 intrastate extortionate credit transactions, 34 restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, 235 inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, 23 6 and the production and consumption of home grown wheat. 2 37 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that each case concerned an economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, concluded that the possession of a gun in a school zone did not involve an economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. 238 The Gun Free School Zones Act, argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terns." Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that even the consumption of home grown wheat, which is probably the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone does not.
2 40 Home consumed wheat could have a substantial influence on the market price of wheat, and as such, Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to assess a penalty for over harvested wheat. 24 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished the Gun Free School Zones Act from the various subject matters where the Court has upheld Congress' exercise of its commerce power by indicating that "the States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the crimi- Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Gun Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional because it had no express jurisdictional element that would limit its reach to firearm possessions that have an explicit connection with interstate commerce.
250
Commenting further about the Act's viability, ChiefJustice Rehnquist discussed the lack of congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone. 2 5 1 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce,1 252 he commented that "to the extent that congressional findings would enable [the Court] to evaluate.., that the activity in question substantially 242 Id. at 1631 n. 
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affected interstate commerce... they are lacking here." 253 Next, ChiefJustice Rehnquist rebuffed the Government's contention that Congress had accumulated institutional expertise regarding the regulation of firearms through previous enactments. 2 54 Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that prior federal enactments and congressional findings could not justify the Gun Free School Zones Act because they did not deal with the Act's subject matter or its relationship to interstate commerce. 2 5 5 Moreover, ChiefJustice Rehnquist determined that the Gun Free School Zones Act was revolutionary and represented "a sharp break" with prior federal firearms legislation. 25 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist then rejected the Government's argument that possession of a firearm in a school zone substantially affects interstate commerce by increasing the frequency of violent crime. 257 The Government contended that increased violent crime affects the national economy in two ways. 2 58 First, insurance spreads the significant cost of violent crimes throughout the population. 259 Second, violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas that are perceived as unsafe. 260 Moreover, the Government argued that the presence of guns in schools would hamper the learning environment, which in turn would result in a less productive citizenry and a dampened national economy. 262 Under the Government's "costs of crime" reasoning, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that it would be "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power. '2 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted that congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender "legal uncertainty." 2 6 4 However, the Court diminished this concern by indicating that Congress has operated under legal uncertainty since the Court in Marbury v. 
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B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that Congress had overstepped its Commerce Clause power in enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act, 268 but described the majority's opinion as a "necessary, though, limited holding." 269 Justice Kennedy emphasized the need for the Court to prevent the federal government's continued intrusion on the states' sovereignty. 2 70 Because the Gun Free School Zones Act foreclosed the states from "experimenting and exercising their own judgment" in an area to which they claim a right to act based on their history and expertise, 27 1 justice Kennedy saw the Act as an invalid erosion of the Tenth Amendment. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE Justice Thomas also joined the majority, but wrote separately to explain why he thought that the Court has drifted far from its original understanding of the Commerce Clause. 273 Justice Thomas argued that the substantial effects test, "if taken to its logical extreme, would
give Congress a 'police power' over all aspects of American life." 274 However, Justice Thomas commented that the Court has always "rejected readings of the Commerce Clause... that would permit Congress to exercise a police power." 275 Justice Thomas additionally refuted Justice Steven's accusation that the majority decision was a "radical departure" from precedent. 276 Instead, Justice Thomas concluded that "[i]f anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930s from a century and a half of precedent." 2 77 Up until the mid-1930s, Justice Thomas argued, "it was widely understood ing his conclusion, Justice Breyer applied three basic principles of Commerce Clause interpretation. First, Congress' commerce power encompasses the power to regulate local activities insofar as they "significantly" affect interstate commerce. 290 Second, in determining whether a local activity will have a significant effect upon interstate commerce, the Court must consider the cumulative effect of all similar instances versus an individual act. 2 91 Third, the Court must give Congress leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 292 Thus, argued Justice Breyer, the issue in the current case is not whether the regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce, but whether Congress had a rational basis for so concluding.
293
Justice Breyer discussed how, based on statistical and other evidence, Congress could have found a connection between school violence and interstate commerce.29 4 Justice Breyer reasoned that because guns in schools undermine the quality of education, Congress could have found that education is inextricably intertwined with interstate commerce and that gun-related violence in schools is a commercial problem.
95
Finally,Justice Breyer indicated his three major concerns with the majority's opinion. 2 96 First, he took exception to the Court's upholding of Congressional actions, such as the regulation of loan-sharking, which had a less significant impact on commerce than school violence.
2 9 7 Second, he rejected the majority's distinction between commercial and noncommercial transactions, arguing that even if such a categorization could be made, schools could rationally be placed in the commercial category. 29 298 Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 299 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting) . 300 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the Gun Free School Zones Act is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. First, this Note contends that the majority failed to apply the well-established rational standard of review to its analysis of the Act's constitutionality. Under this standard, Congress did not have to provide an explicit connection between the Gun Free School Zones Act and interstate commerce. Rather, the relevant judicial inquiry was only whether Congress could have rationally concluded that gun possession at school affects interstate commerce. Because Congress, in related gun control legislation, specified the link between juvenile gun possession and interstate commerce, it could have rationally concluded that guns at school affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, even if Congress was required to provide express findings linking gun violence in the schools with interstate commerce, it did so when it retroactively amended the Gun Free School Zones Act.
Second, this Note contends that the Supreme Court erred in determining that education and local crime issues fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of state and local governments. This Note finds support for Congress' ability to legislate over localized school gun possession under the Commerce Clause in the judicial ratification of similar gun control legislation and in the Supreme Court's approval of other social policy legislation which possess more tenuous links to interstate commerce.
Finally, this Note argues that the Supreme Court erred in determining that gun violence in the schools does not substantially affect interstate commerce because the presence of guns diminishes the educational process. The primary objective of the American educational system is to prepare the country's future workforce. Given that the produced goods and services will be traded throughout interstate and foreign commerce, a deteriorated educational system substantially affects interstate commerce.
A. THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY A RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF
REVIEW
The Supreme Court, in ruling that the Gun Free School Zones Act was an impermissible exercise of Congress' legislative authority under the Commerce Clause, contended that the Act's legislative history did not provide congressional "findings" detailing the nexus between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 30 
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the Supreme Court erred by failing to apply the well established rational basis standard of review. Had the Court used the proper standard of review, it would have upheld the Gun Free School Zones Act as a constitutional enactment under Congress' commerce power.
The Rational Basis Standard of Review
The rational basis test provides that federal courts must defer to a congressional determination that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 3 0 2 Thus, acts of Congress are presumed constitutional under the Commerce Clause unless a reviewing court determines that no rational basis could exist for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. 
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linking gun control at school to interstate commerce, the Supreme Court failed to apply the rational basis test. As discussed further in part B below, because guns at school decrease the quality of education, 3 10 ease drug trafficking, 3 1 ' and create unnecessary social costs in the form of medical expenses and increased insurance rates, 3 12 Congress could have rationally concluded that guns affect interstate commerce. Under the rationale basis standard, Congress was not required to collect data evidencing this nexus. Nor was Congress required to identify the source of its congressional power for the enactment. Application of the rational basis standard is essential to the constitutional separation of powers. The Supreme Court has explained that it accords great weight to the decisions of Congress because it is a co-equal branch of government.
3 1 3 To require Congress to identify the precise source of authority for each of its enactments would unduly constrain its ability to legislate and subjugate it to overextending judicial power. 3 14 Thus, in demanding that Congress supply a legislative record justifying the link between gun possession at school and interstate commerce, the Supreme Court overstepped its authority.
Earlier Gun Control Enactments Provide the Necessary Nexus to Interstate Commerce
The Court erred in concluding that Congress could only rely on the legislative history specific to the Gun Free School Zones Act to provide findings for a rational basis connection to the Commerce Clause. In addition to the legislative history associated with a particular piece of legislation, courts may consider the history of other legislation regulating the same class of activities.
3 15 The rationale behind this principle is that after Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its members gain experience that may re-310 "Gun violence at school impedes the ability of schools to attract and retain qualified school personnel and threatens the education goals related to student achievement." Gun Free School Zones Act Hearings, supra note 166, at 46 (statement of Joel Packer, Legislative Specialist, National Education Association and National PTA).
311 See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6) (1994) ("Gun possession in the vicinity of schools is associated with drug dealing, an activity that Congress has recognized to affect interstate commerce."). 312 The estimated cost to society for firearm injuries is $387,235 per fatality and $29,870 per non-fatal injury requiring hospitalization. DOROTHY P. RICE 319 Congress' earliest gun control legislation was grounded in its taxing power. For example, the National Firearms Act, which is applicable only to machine guns, "sawed-off' shotguns and rifles, silencers, and the like, is grounded on Congress' tax power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (originally codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1132; now codified, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § § 5801-5872). Its prohibitions are based on the imposition of an excise tax on the business of dealing in such weapons, on their transfers, along with related requirements for registration of the dealer, the transfers, and the weapons. The Gun Free Schools Zone Act is not tied to taxation registration or reporting, and is applicable to a broader class of firearms than that covered by the National Firearms Act. Thus, the National Firearms Act is not considered in analyzing the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause. which made it unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun. There is no committee report and sparse legislative history concerning this provision. The only express explanation for it is the statement by its sponsor, Representative Hughes, stating "I do not know why anyone would object to the banning of machine guns." 3 3 '
This enactment is highly analogous to the Gun Free School Zones Act. While the legislative history of § 922(o) indicated that Congress considered the relationship between the availability of machine guns, violent crime, and narcotics trafficking, 332 Congress did not provide express legislative findings regarding the mere possession of ordinary firearms.
333
Only a few circuit courts have addressed the constitutionality of 326 See supra note 128. The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988,338 which added 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(p), also lacks an express legislative intent to regulate interstate commerce. Section 922 (p) makes it unlawful for any person to "manufacture, import, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive" any firearms either not detectable "by walk-through metal detectors" or which "when subjected to inspection by the type of x-ray machines commonly used at airports, do not generate an image that accurately depicts the shape of any major component." 339 Like the Gun Free School Zones Act, § 922(p) contains no express requirement of an interstate nexus for the possession offense. 3 40 Moreover, the committee reports accompanying the Act, which indicate that the purpose of § 9 22(p) is to reduce the threat posed by firearms which could avoid detection at security checkpoints, including courthouses, airports, etc., do not have an express interstate commerce context.Y" It is important to note that the Firearms Owners' Protection Act and the Undetectable Firearms Act, as well as the Gun Free School Zones Act, are amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 922, which was added by the Gun Control Act of 1968. As discussed above, the 1968 Act contained specific congressional findings linking gun control to interstate commerce. Legislative history accompanying prior gun control enactments should be used to convey a nexus between gun possession in school zones with interstate commerce. If it is not, then other gun control initiatives which also lack this express connection, such as the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 and the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, are also in jeopardy.
anticipated. The Lopez decision threatens the constitutionality of existing gun control statutes such as the Firearm Owners' Protection Act, the Undetectable Firearms Act, and the Brady Act. Like the Gun Free School Zones Act, none of these acts contain express commerce elements or have a legislative history directly linking the objective of the Act to interstate commerce. Thus, if the Court decides not to apply a rational basis test to these statutes, their existence may be in jeopardy. In addition, Lopez may have a "chilling effect" on other federal anticrime legislation. As Congress historically has used its commerce power to enact federal crime bills, the Lopez decision may place severe constitutional limits on the federal government's ability to enact future legislation addressing the national problem of crime. Congress may have to use another one of its enumerated powers, such as the taxing and spending power, to create future federal crime legislation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Note concludes that the majority improperly decided United States v. Lopez for three reasons. First, the majority failed to apply a rational basis test to its analysis of the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones act. While Congress did not provide an explicit connection between the Act and interstate commerce when the legislation was originally passed, under the rational basis test the Act would still be constitutional because prior gun control legislation laid the foundation for its enactment. Second, the Supreme Court erred in deciding that Congress could not regulate education and local crime because these were traditionally state domains. Support for Congress' ability to legislate over school gun possession through the Commerce Clause can be found in the Supreme Court's ratification of other localized crime control legislation and its approval of social policy legislation which possess more tenuous links to interstate commerce. Finally, the Supreme Court erred in determining that gun violence in schools does not substantially affect interstate commerce because such violence deteriorates educational standards and provides a less productive future workforce.
Lopez may severely impact crime control measures. The Lopez decision threatens the constitutionality of existing gun control statutes such as the Firearm Owners' Protection Act, the Undetectable Firearms Act, and the Brady Act. As Congress historically has used its commerce power to enact federal crime bills, the Lopez decision may place severe constitutional limits on the federal government's ability to enact future legislation to address the national problem of crime.
1996]
1537
